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Following the failure to find anything even remotely resembling weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq, and the consequent upending of a key part of the 
rationale for the 2003 invasion there, questions about intelligence, how it is 
gathered by security agencies, and the way in which it substance and attendant 
processes are subjected to scrutiny and questioning have come to the fore of 
political debate in Britain. One of the most pressing issues surrounding this 
debate, as demonstrated by Bochel, Defty and Dunn above, is that there is a 
transparency gap at the heart of the Westminster parliament’s approach to 
scrutinising the intelligence and security infrastructure. Quite what, if anything, 
might be done about this gap, has become a pressing problem, not just in the 
long-term aftermath of the Iraq invasion calamity, but also in the context of more 
recent attempts to reform politics following the fall-out from the 2009 MPs’ 
expenses scandal.  
 
Although the political crisis prompted by the revelations about MPs’ expenses 
was confined to the relatively narrow issue of how public funds were used by 
public servants in the course of their work, the issue quickly expanded to bigger 
issues about how politics works, the way in which political institutions function, 
and how these institutions and the people inside them might work better. This 
necessitated questioning about how parliament operated more generally: the 
House of Commons Reform Committee established in summer 2009, and chaired 
by the senior Labour backbencher Tony Wright, was tasked with generating a 
range of proposals designed to tilt the terms of trade away from the executive 
and towards parliament. Its subsequent report focused extensively on how 
executive scrutiny might be enhanced through significant changes to the 
Commons select committee system. Part of its series of proposals related to the 
Intelligence and Security Committee. Since 2008, both Houses of Parliament have 
been able, following changes pursued as part of the Labour government’s 
Governance of Britain project, to propose Members that the Prime Minister might 
wish to recommend for ISC membership. Yet, for the Reform Committee, such 
changes did not go far enough, and the report argued that it was ‘unsatisfactory’ 
that its proposals to elect members to select committee could not also apply to 
the ISC, given its unique origins. The Reform Committee was therefore limited to 
recommending that the chair of the ISC be held by convention by a Member from 
the majority party, that those who wished to stand for election to chair of the ISC 
should seek the formal consent of the prime minister in advance of a ballot, and 
that the rest of the members should secure places on the ISC using the new 
processes recommended by the Reform Committee. 
 
The debate over whether Commons select committees should be elected is an 
issue of long-standing controversy in the House, but on 4 March 2010, MPs 
remarkably managed to agree, amongst other things, to adopt a process of 
electing Members to committee service, a staggering achievement that will 
remove the ability of the government to choose those who will scrutinise it 
(assuming these changes are eventually combined into House Standing Orders, 
which they had not been by the time parliament was dissolved in April 2010). 
However, the Reform Committee’s suggestions for electing members to the ISC 
were not approved as part of the broad package of change approved. 
 
This latest failure to secure change to the ISC, even as part of a much bigger 
reform programme, demonstrates, as Bochel, Defty and Dunn argue, just how 
hard it has been for parliament to take ownership of the scrutiny processes 
pertaining to matters of intelligence and security. However, once the Commons 
select committees finally shift to the new process of elected members, and as the 
House as a whole takes more control over its affairs and procedures following 
the range of changes approved in February and March 2010, it is likely that the 
strange extra-parliamentary twilight status of the ISC will come to look even 
more bizarre than it already does. Consequently, although the ISC escaped being 
subject to the 2010 Commons changes, that escape is unlikely to be long-lasting, 
and parliamentarians and the public will now more easily see the anachronism of 
the ISC in comparison to the rest of parliament’s increasingly robust scrutiny 
infrastructure.  
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